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Heather M. Kolinskyt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The small fishing boat sat empty at the end of a pier near a small 
row of townhouses on Layton Key, Florida. In it, an empty bottle of 
rum, a tarp, and a few limes. There were high winds that morning, a 
precursor to Hurricane Andrew,l which would arrive two days later. 
The boat traveled approximately 105 miles through the Florida Straits 
to arrive at its destination. Six Cuban men arrived that morning, and 
when they stepped ashore, they were presumably entitled to stay. 2 
Just one year earlier, the Soviet Union had collapsed. 3 The subsidies 
and benefits Cuba received from its Soviet partner had diminished, if 
not completely disappeared.4 
These Cuban men, like many Cubans who would arrive on U.S. 
shores during the early 1990s, were more likely seeking to escape 
t Heather M. Kolinsky, B.A. Stetson University, J.D. Rutgers University - Camden, is 
an associate professor of law at Barry University Law School in Orlando, Florida. 
The topic of this article was presented at the 2008 Southeastern Association of Law 
Schools annual meeting as a part of the New Scholars Workshop. I must thank Colby 
Ferris and Lindsay Harrison Hall for their research support; and Tai Heng Chen, Pat 
Tolan, and Leonard Birdsong for their helpful comments. Finally, my heartfelt thanks 
to Richard Robbins whose research and citation support for this article were 
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1. Hurricane Andrew hit south Florida on August 24, 1992, as a category five hurricane. 
Ed Rappaport, Preliminary Report Hurricane Andrew 16-28 August, 1992, NAT'L 
HURRICANE CTR. (Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html. 
2. See 8 U.S.c. § 1255 (2006). 
3. ROBERT STRAYER, WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION COLLAPSE? UNDERSTANDING 
HISTORICAL CHANGE 3 (1998) (noting official dissolution of Soviet Union at the end 
of the day, December 25, 1991, after President Mikhael S. Gorbachev's resignation 
speech); Mikhael S. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
Resignation Speech (Dec. 25, 1991), available at http://www.pubJicpurpose.comllib-
gorb911225.htm. 
4. See LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM & REVOLUTION 381-87 (2d ed. 
1995), available at http://www.historyofCuba.comlhistory/havanailperez2.htm 
(discussing the impact that the collapse of the Soviet Union had on resources in Cuba 
and Cuba's relationship with its Eastern bloc trading partners, as well as government 
imposed rationing of goods). 
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food scarcity, avoid economic deprivation, and discover opportunity 
than they were seeking to escape an oppressive political regime. 5 
Nearly twenty years later, Cubans continue to enjoy preferential 
immigration treatment, although it has been limited since 1994 to 
Cuban refugees who actually reach our shores. 6 
Imagine another small fishing boat lands the next day, having 
braved high winds and rough seas, but this one is filled with six 
Haitian men. They seek to escape political oppression and economic 
deprivation. 7 During the preceding year, Haitians had experienced a 
military coup that ousted their first democratically elected president; 
as a result, thousands of Haitians were paroled into the United States 
after prescreening in Guantanamo Bay.8 However, this process 
grounded to a halt in May 1992 because of the sheer numbers of 
Haitians seeking to escape political violence. 9 
When these Haitians stepped ashore, there was no presumption that 
they were entitled to asylum, nor special consideration whatsoever. 10 
5. See id. 
6. Wet-Foot Dry-Foot Policy, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT, http://www.usimmigration 
support.orglwetfoot-dryfoot.html (last visited May 16,2011). While Cuban refugees 
intercepted at sea are still entitled to make an asylum claim, they are more likely to be 
returned to Cuba than permitted to enter the United States. Id. 
7. See Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REv. 625, 625-26 (2008). 
8. Jean Bertrand Aristide, who became the first democratically elected president of Haiti 
in 1991, was overthrown in a military coup by the Tonton Macoutes just seven 
months after he was elected. Id. at 693. In 1991, after the coup in Haiti, 
approximately 10,490 Haitians were paroled into the United States after a 
prescreening interview at Guantanamo determined that they had a credible fear of 
persecution if returned to Haiti. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY ON HAITIAN MIGRANTS 3 (Jan. 21, 2005), available at 
http://trac.syr.edulimmigration/libraryIP960.pd£ But this parole did not mean they 
would receive asylum, and in fact, many did not. Id. at 3-4. 
9. WASEM, supra note 8, at 3. On May 24,1992, because of the surge of Haitians, the 
U.S. Coast Guard was once again ordered to intercept all Haitians in boats and 
immediately return them to Haiti without interviews to determine whether they were 
at risk of persecution. Id. In 1994, the Clinton administration again attempted to 
prescreen Haitian refugees for asylum but stopped after a few weeks, citing the 
exodus of Haitians as the reason to suspend the screening, much like the Bush 
administration had. Id. at 3-4. 
10. See id. at 2-3. Beginning in 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard had been directed to stop and 
search vessels suspected of transporting undocumented Haitians. Id. From 1981 
through 1990, 22,940 Haitians were questioned at sea. Id. Of this number, eleven 
Haitians qualified to apply for asylum in the United States and the rest were denied 
access. See id. Other than the brief respites from interdiction in 1991 and 1994, 
Haitians have historically received little consideration in the asylum process. 
Currently, Haitians are still subject to interdiction and many more are denied asylum. 
See Javier Arteaga, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: More Than Forty Years Later 
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In fact, they were more likely to be deported rather than receive 
asylum in this country, let alone the opportunity to seek permanent 
residency. II To this day, Haitians' "differences" remain a barrier to 
receiving the type of asylum protection enjoyed by their Caribbean 
neighbors. 12 
If discrimination based on nationality or politics is not absurd 
enough when dealing with those seeking refuge in this country, what 
about gender-based discrimination imposed on refugees fleeing the 
same country? Consider a young Chinese man who enters the 
country illegally after being smuggled in a container ship to the port 
in Los Angeles. Although he entered the United States to escape a 
country that forcibly aborted his unborn child and that allowed 
officials to detain him when he refused to tell them where the woman 
carrying his unborn child was hiding, he will not be entitled to 
asylum here because he is male and his '"resistance''' is not deemed 
sufficient to warrant asylum. 13 The irony is that, had the woman who 
a Proposal/or the Future, 3 FLA. INT'T U. L. REV. 509,510-11 (2008) (noting that a 
boat of fleeing Haitian nationals picked up two near-death Cubans at sea, and when 
the vessel arrived in Miami, the Haitians were deported and the Cubans were paroled 
into the United States). However, following the recent earthquake in Haiti, the 
Obama administration announced that it would grant tens of thousands of Haitian 
nationals Temporary Protected Status (TPS). See Sergio Bustos, Obama 
Administration Grants TPS to Haitians, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/haiti/haitians-tps.htm. Only those Haitians in the 
United States as of January 12, 2010, are eligible for TPS. Id. Those who traveled 
here after January 12, 2010, are not eligible for TPS and will be repatriated. Id. 
11. The statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice show that on average, less than 
one-in-four Haitians receive asylum in the United States. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS ASYLUM 
STATISTICS, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoialfoiafreq.htm (follow 
hyperlinks for various years under the heading "Asylum Statistics by Nationality"). 
In 2007, 4486 Haitians applied for asylum, but asylum was only granted to 586. Id. 
In 2008, 3303 applied, and only 510 were approved. Id. In 2009, 1809 applied and 
only 406 were approved. Id. 
12. See Nessel, supra note 7, at 693-94. Nessel notes that "[t]he 'othering' of Haitians 
dates back to the European slave trade with Africa." Id. (citing ROBERT LAWLESS, 
HAITI'S BAD PRESS 30-48 (1992)). Those roots of racism "contributed to the 
characterization of Haitians as "barbarians[,] cannibals," and "voodoo worshippers," 
who were described as "'dumb, drumming, demoralized, and up to no good.'" Id. at 
694 (quoting ROBERT LAWLESS, HAITI'S BAD PRESS 33-34 (1992)). 
13. See Ming Shi Chen v. Bd. Of Immigration Appeals, 247 F. App'x 304, 305 (2d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296,313-14 (2d Cir. 
2007) (noting that "the fact that an individual's spouse or partner has been forced to 
have an abortion 'does not, on its own, constitute resistance to coercive family 
planning'''); Zhi Zhi Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App'x 528, 529-31 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the immigration judge was not unreasonable in characterizing Chen's 
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was carrying his unborn child traveled to the United States in the 
container ship, she would be entitled to asylum based solely on the 
fact that she underwent the procedure that aborted their child. 14 
The regulation of the entry and exclusion of aliens 15 in our country 
is a "fundamental act[] of sovereignty" that is "vested exclusively in 
the legislative and executive branches.,,16 "The single most salient 
feature of the government's immigration power is the fact that it is 
substantially unconstrained as a constitutional matter.,,17 Congress's 
legislative power over the regulation of immigration is more 
complete than over any other conceivable subject. 18 
This power has disparate results in its application. Should these 
disparities be addressed when they violate our most basic societal 
precepts, particularly equal protection? When dealing with asylum 
and refugees, should our values control our policies? To the extent 
value judgments are made, how should those who shape immigration 
policy consider the implications of those value judgments, 
particularly when they may even conflict with our own cultural 
values, which by their very nature underlie our own legislative 
protections? Finally, to what extent should these decisions be 
reconsidered, adapted, and changed as time goes by? 
This article addresses these questions with respect to the adoption 
and enforcement of per se asylum policies in the United States. 
Section II discusses the central concepts of asylum and how they 
have evolved in the United States. Section III reviews these 
protections as they apply to two different groups who have been 
afforded per se asylum protection-Chinese and Cuban nationals. 
Section IV discusses the problems that arise when similar social 
outburst at the family planning office "as mere disorderly conduct that fell short of the 
type offormal and public resistance" required). But see Jia Shan Ou v. Mukasey, 260 
F. App'x 371, 372 (2d Cir. 2008) (alluding to the fact that a former husband might be 
able to demonstrate past persecution where his wife was sterilized and he was fined, 
arrested, detained, and beaten while in custody, but presumption of future persecution 
was rebutted because he was divorced and had lived in China for eight years without 
incident). 
14. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42)(A) (2006). 
15. "Alien" is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Id. 
§ I 10 I (a)(3). 
16. Kai Wu Chan v. Reno, 916 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 
864 (1982); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954». 
17. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 50 (2006). 
18. Id. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
reI. Mezei, 345 U.s. 206, 210 (1953); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909». 
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groups are afforded different levels of protection from persecution. 
Also, section IV considers whether such protection should be 
available at all and offers suggestions on how to better implement per 
se asylum protection if this type of preferential asylum method is 
retained. 
II. ASYLUM, PERSECUTION, AND PROCESS 
A. Asylum 
Asylum is not a product of the modem age; instead, it is a concept 
that has existed for at least 3500 years. 19 However, asylum, as that 
term is used today, is different than that of times past, shifting from 
"protection from extradition" to a concept that embodies both 
political and humanitarian dimensions. 20 Asylum is codified by both 
international declaration and domestic law that has been adopted by 
the United States. 21 Under international law, those who seek asylum 
must establish they are a "refugee," which is defined as a person who 
has a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality [membership in a particular social 
group,] or political opinion, [and] is outside the country of 
his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear 
or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling 
to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country; 
19. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S 
REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 33 (1993). The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees report points to the revocation of the Edicts of Nantes in 
1685 as the beginning of the modern tradition of asylum in Europe, but it existed long 
before that time. Jd. Despite some shifts prior to the modern era, "asylum continued 
to be viewed more as a prerogative of the Sovereign than as an individual right to 
protection until the early years of the 20th century." Id. 
20. See id. "The disintegration of the Turkish, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires in 
the early twentieth century emphasized the international scope of refugee 
movements." Maryellen Fullerton, The International and National Protection of 
Refugees, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 245, 247 (Hurst 
Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004). As this disintegration occurred, refugees came to be 
described in terms of their nationality, "implicitly recognizing that political events had 
triggered" their flight. Id. 
21. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
NRES/217(IIl) (Dec. 10, 1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides that "[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution." Id.; see also Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 
102. 
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or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his [ or her] former habitual residence [as a result 
of such events], is unable or, owing to such fear or for 
reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to 
return to it. 22 
Persons who qualify as refugees are protected from "refoulment," 
the return of a person to a country where her life or freedom would be 
threatened. 23 Thus, in sovereign states that are signatories to the 1951 
Refugee Convention24 or the 1967 Protocol,25 extending asylum to 
refugees comports with the principle of nonrefoulment and satisfies a 
nation's obligations under those documents. 26 The process and the 
manner in which asylum is granted may vary from nation to nation.27 
B. Refugees in the United States 
1. Persecution 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Ace8 and the Refugee Act 
of 1980,29 for a person to receive refugee status, that person must first 
22. G.A. Res. 429 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. N1775, at 48 
(Dec. 14, 1950). 
23. ld. 
24. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The 
United Nations convened a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Geneva which resulted 
in a treaty concerning refugees known as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. This covered only those persons who had become refugees as a result of 
events occurring before January 1, 1951. ld. 
25. The 1967 Protocol extended coverage to all refugees regardless of when they had 
become refugees. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S.267. 
26. The United States was a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, which was codified in the 
Refugee Act of 1980. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
Technically, asylum alone does not satisfy the United States' obligation of 
nonrefoulment because it is discretionary, however, that is why federal law also 
provides for restriction of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. § 
241(b)(3). 
27. See, e.g., Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.auJ 
(search "Search ID or Current Titles" for "Migration Act 1958"; then follow 
"Migration Act 1958" hyperlink); Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, c. 23 
(Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/23, amended by 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1996, c. 49 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/49; see generally REBECCA WALLACE & 
ADELE BROWN, ASYLUM PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY 
HANDBOOK (1999). 
28. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006). 
29. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
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demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution. 30 The problem is that "persecution," the touchstone of 
asylum claims, is not easily defined. Indeed, the immigration statutes 
offer no definition, although courts have tried to define it. 31 At its 
heart, persecution presumes punishment in some form. 32 However, 
this definition merely provides the context in which conduct must be 
examined. It also presumes some level of government approval or 
disregard and that such conduct is directed at a protected group. 33 
Finally, it presumes that this conduct is not acceptable to other 
nation-states in the global community. 34 
The Fourth Circuit has found that '" [p ]ersecution involves the 
infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or 
freedom'" on account of a protected ground. 35 It is less difficult to 
quantify persecution in terms of torture or the threat of death, but it is 
more problematic when it involves more discreet forms of 
punishment. Thus, persecution has also been identified as "'the 
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the 
deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials 
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
31. Nikijuluw v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (defining past persecution as 
"requiring that the totality of a petitioner's experiences add up to more than mere 
discomfort, unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment"); see, e.g., Svistun v. 
Holder, 354 F. App'x 872, 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 
F.3d 295, 307 (5th Cir. 2005)) (defining persecution as "the infliction of suffering or 
harm, under government sanction, under persons who differ in a way regarded as 
offensive ... in a manner condemned by civilized governments"); Qiao Hua Li v. 
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 
F.3d 797, 797 (8th Cir. 2004)) (holding that "persecution involves the infliction or 
threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or freedom .... [A]1though the term 
'persecution' includes actions less severe than threats to life or freedom, actions must 
rise above the level of mere harassment"); Osaghae v. INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th 
Cir. 1991); T-Z-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 163, 170-72 (B.LA. 2007) (quoting H.R. REp. No. 
95-1452, at 5, as reprinted in 1978 V.S.C.C.A.N 4700, 4704). 
32. See Osaghae, 942 F.2d at 1163. Judge Posner defined persecution as "punishment for 
political, religious, or other reasons that our country does not recognize as legitimate." 
Id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit articulated the definition as '''infliction of suffering or 
harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as 
offensive ... in a manner condemned by civilized governments. '" SVistun, 354 F. 
App'x at 874 (quoting Zhao, 404 F.3d at 307). 
33. See Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Kasinga, 21 1. & 
N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.LA. 1996)). 
34. See Svistun, 354 F. App'x at 874 (quoting Yu Zhao, 404 F.3d at 307). 
35. Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d at 177 (quoting Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 797 
(8th Cir. 2004)). 
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of life. ",36 
harassment, or 
persecution. 37 
However, "mere discomfiture, unpleasantness, 
unfair treatment" do not rise to the level of 
2. "Government Involvement" in Persecution 
In addition to the problem of quantifying sufficient harm, courts 
have had to define "government involvement. ,,38 While direct 
government action is easily identifiable, courts have also found an 
applicant has been persecuted when the harm is inflicted by persons 
"the government is unwilling or unable to control," which is a 
different matter altogether. 39 The fate of the second claim, involving 
nongovernmental conduct, "depends on some showing either that the 
alleged persecutors are aligned with the government or that the 
government is unwilling or unable to control them.,,40 This subset of 
government involvement creates a broader range of potential issues 
because it extends from government complicity to government 
ineffectiveness. 
"In determining whether a government is willing and able to 
control persecutors, .. , 'the most telling datum'" is whether there 
was "a prompt response by local authorities to prior incidents.,,41 It is 
a threefold connection: a recognition of the problem, a willingness to 
investigate, and a commitment to prosecute where appropriate. 42 If 
there is a willingness to investigate and institute criminal 
proceedings, then the requisite connection between government 
inaction and fear of future persecution is not present. 43 
In Al Khalili v. Holder,44 the asylee claimed previously inflicted 
and future threats, including potential honor killings, from his former 
wife's family in Jordan. 45 The Sixth Circuit found there was 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate the government was unwilling or 
unable to control the family members and protect Al Khalili and his 
36. T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 170-72 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 95-1452, at 5 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4708). 
37. Nikijuluw v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2005). 
38. See. e.g., Bartesaghi-Lay v. INS, 9 F.3d 819,822 (lOth Cir. 1993). 
39. See. e.g., id 
40. Raza v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 
F.3d 67, 71 (Ist Cir. 2006». 
41. Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Harutyunyan v. 
Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64,68 (1st Cir. 2005». 
42. See id 
43. See id 
44. 557 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2009). 
45. Id at 436. 
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family from hann. 46 However, in In re R_A_,47 the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an immigration judge's finding 
that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to protect a 
battered woman from an abusive spouse, where police responded 
initially but failed to follow through and a Guatemalan judge told her 
he would not interfere in domestic disputes. 48 
3. Persecution of "Particular Social Groups" 
Finally, persecution must involve an identifiable group. 49 Under 
the 1951 Refugee Convention 50 and the Refugee Act of 1980/' five 
specific groups have already been identified as groups who can 
satisfy the "on account of' part of the definition of refugee, including 
persons who are persecuted on account of race, religion, ethnicity, 
nationality, or political opinion. 52 However, the Refugee Act and 
Convention also identify "particular social groups" as persons who 
may satisfy the "on account of' part of the definition. 53 This is not a 
readily identifiable group, but is defined by the circumstances present 
at the time of application. 54 
Particular social group is defined as individuals who are members 
of a group of persons who share a "common, immutable 
characteristic." 55 For example, based on this definition, the BIA has 
46. Id. The Sixth Circuit reached similar conclusions in El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F. 
App'x 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2008) and Kere v. Gonzales, 252 F. App'x 708, 713 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
47. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated and remanded with stay of 
reconsideration, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att'y Gen. Jan. 19,2001), remanded by 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 694 (Att'y Gen. Jan. 19, 2005), stay lifted and remanded by 24 I. & N. Dec. 
629 (Att'y Gen. Sept. 25, 2008). 
48. Id. at 909,911,914. 
49. See id. at 918 (noting four characteristics that are the focus of persecution: race, 
religion, nationality, and political opinion). 
50. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,1951,189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152. 
51. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
52. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra 
note 50, at 152. Gender is notably absent from this broad definition. 
53. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra 
note 50, at 152. 
54. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the 
determination of what constitutes a "particular social group" depends on the context in 
which it is applied). 
55. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), modified by In re Mogharrabi, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). The particular group characteristic is not fixed, but 
is determined on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the broader definition. 
Id. 
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recognized a number of particular social groups for asylum purposes 
including Filipinos of mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry, members of 
the Marehan sub clan of Somalia who share ties of kinship and 
linguistic commonalities, and persons identified as homosexuals by 
the Cuban government. 56 Regardless of the characteristic identified, 
it must be one that members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their 
individual identities or consciences. 57 
In addition to an immutable characteristic, the group identified 
must have a level of social visibility or recognition. 58 The lack of 
social visibility or recognition was highlighted by the BIA when that 
board reviewed a claim that "Guatemalan women who have been 
involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe 
that women are to live under male domination" was a particular 
social group. 59 While accepting that these women shared common 
characteristics, the BIA found that those characteristics did not 
translate into a societal recognition of this group in Guatemala.60 The 
BIA observed that "the social group concept would virtually swallow 
the entire refugee definition if common characteristics, coupled with 
a meaningful level of harm, were all that need be shown.,,61 Thus, 
tragic circumstances and harm were not a sufficient basis to establish 
social visibility or recognition without a more concrete connection to 
society as a whole. 62 In re R -A - has had a long, involved history as it 
56. Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental Brief at 8 n.7, (name redacted) 
(B.I.A. Apr. 13,2009) (citing In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792 (B.I.A. 1997); In re 
H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 
(B.I.A. 1990)), available at http://graphics8.nytirnes.com/packages/pd£'us/20090716-
asylum-brief.pdf. Other groups have not satisfied this definition, including Chinese 
citizens of low economic status, family members of deserters, and young working-
class males who have not served in the military in EI Salvador. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 906, 917-18 (B.I.A 1999) (citing Li v. INS, 92 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1996); De 
Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1990); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 
1571, 1572 (9th Cir. 1986)), vacated and remanded with stay o/reconsideration, 22 1. 
& N. Dec. 906 (Att'y Gen. Jan. 19,2001), remanded by 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att'y 
Gen. Jan. 19, 2005), stay lifted and remanded by 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Att'y Gen. 
Sept. 25, 2008). However, in these instances, the Ninth Circuit added another 
component to the definition of particular social group. The Ninth Circuit required 
"the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported 
members." Id. at 912. 
57. In re Acosta, 191. & N. Dec. at 233. 
58. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951,959 (B.LA. 2006). 
59. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 907. 
60. Id. at 918. 
61. Id. at 919. 
62. Id. at 937-38 (dissenting opinion). 
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has bounced between the BIA and the Attorney General. At the heart 
of the matter is whether victims of domestic violence who seek 
asylum can be recognized as a particular social group. 63 It serves as 
an example of how difficult it can be to quantify a particular social 
group, and that such a determination must be made in spite of a 
tangible harm suffered. 
The BIA faced a similar problem when it first addressed China's 
population control program in In re Chang.64 There, the BIA's 
failure to find that Chinese couples whose children had been aborted 
were entitled to asylum hinged largely on its inability to categorize 
the persecution as "on account of' some identified group. 65 The BIA 
recognized that individuals who suffered forced abortion were not 
singled out--everyone was subject to the same treatment.66 Thus, the 
failure to connect a forced abortion with an identifiable group--
whether political opinion or particular social group--was a problem 
both with social visibility and an immutable characteristic where the 
law was not inherently persecutory on its face. 67 Interestingly, when 
Congress chose to recognize this group of persons, those who 
suffered forced abortion or involuntary sterilization under coercive 
population control, as an identifiable group, it did so based on 
political opinion and not based on particular social group. 68 
4. Asylum Per Se 
Generally, an asylee or refugee must satisfy the burden of proving 
that he or she has been persecuted in order to demonstrate eligibility 
for asylum. 69 However, not all persons seeking refugee status are 
required to satisfy that burden. In some instances, classes of persons 
are deemed to satisfy the burden by virtue of their nationality, 
ethnicity, or some event or episode they may have suffered. 70 For 
example, female Chinese nationals who demonstrate that they have 
been subject to a forced abortion and Chinese nationals of either 
gender subjected to involuntary sterilization are entitled to a 
63. Jd. at 907 (majority opinion). 
64. 20 I. & N. Dec. 38,38 (B.I.A. 1989). 
65. Id. at 44. 
66. Jd. at 44-45. 
67. Id. at 45. 
68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 10 1 (a)(42)(A) (2006). 
69. Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App'x 956, 957 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Naizgi v. 
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that "[a]n alien bears the burden 
of proving eligibility for asylum")); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208. 13 (a), (b)(l) (2010). 
70. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 10 1 (a)(42)(A), 1255. 
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presumption that they have been persecuted. 71 These presumptions 
have their genesis in legislative action prompted by events that 
occurred both in China as well as in the United States.72 Cubans who 
arrive on our shores are presumably paroled73 into this country 
without having to demonstrate that they have been persecuted. 74 
They are able to skip asylum proceedings in their entirety and apply 
for permanent status within a year of arriving. 75 
71. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, which essentially eliminated the requirement that an applicant 
must show persecution based on "race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion" as described by the United Nations for 
three classes of aliens: (1) those who have "been forced to abort a pregnancy or to 
undergo involuntary sterilization"; (2) those who have "been persecuted for failure or 
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population 
control program"; and (3) those who have a "well founded fear that [they] will be 
forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, 
or resistance." Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689. Based on the 
language in the statute, anyone who falls under one of the three definitions in section 
601 can receive asylum in the United States. See id. This is not limited to individuals 
from China, even though the vast majority of asylum cases come out of China due to 
its population control policy. 
72. See infra Part IV; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Tiananmen Square, N.Y. TIMES (May 
22, 2009), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/internationaVcountriesandterritoriesl 
chinaltiananmen-square/index.html. 
73. The Attorney General may ... in his discretion parole into the 
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may 
prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian 
reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for 
admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall 
not be regarded as an admission ofthe alien .... 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole is a form of relief from immigration detention; it is 
not a form of relief from removal proceedings, and when the purposes of parole have 
been served, the parolee must be returned to custody, and removal proceedings must 
continue. Id. 
74. See 8 U.S.c. § 1255. As noted in the introductory example, this class of persons is 
given carte blanche admission to the United States based upon their nationality, which 
entitles them to a presumption of refugee status and parole into this country. Cuban 
immigration to the United States has its roots in "major revolutionary upheaval." 
ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN 
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (1985). While historically there may have 
been a justification for this preferential treatment, more than one legal commentator 
has noted such justifications have eroded over time while'the policies have remained 
largely unchanged. See, e.g., id.; Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: ;,Mirando 
por los Ojos de Don Quijote 0 Sancho Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REv. 902, 907 (2001) 
[hereinafter Mirando por los Ojos]. 
75. See 8 U.S.c. § 1255. 
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Per se asylum provides certain classes of asylum seekers with a 
rebuttable presumption of persecution based upon an identifiable 
characteristic that is not available to others who seek asylum. 76 Thus, 
certain asylum applicants are relieved of the initial burden of 
demonstrating persecution and the burden shifts to the government to 
demonstrate a lack of persecution. 77 
C. Process 
Prior to 1980, the admission of refugees was largely unregulated by 
Congress. 78 Instead, the President determined which groups of 
asylum seekers would be granted admission to the United States. 79 
Inherent in this approach was an ethnocentric and politically 
motivated judgment as to which groups of persons should be granted 
asylum.80 Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, in part, to act as 
an equalizing force in the grant of asylum in the United States, and to 
create an "asylum framework based on a principle of 
76. See id. § 1 101 (a)(42). 
77. See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, III (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ l208.l6(b)(l)(ii) (2008) ("If an applicant has established past persecution on 
account of one of the protected grounds, the government bears the burden of rebutting 
the presumption that the applicant's life or freedom will be threatened in the future by 
a preponderance of the evidence."). 
78. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L. J. 458, 503-05 (2009) (explaining that Congress's dissatisfaction with 
executive use of parole power to respond to refugee populations in the 1960s and 
1970s prompted the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980). 
79. Id. at 505-06. But, Congress acted on an ad hoc basis as well, creating legislation to 
benefit deserving groups of refugees as the need arose. See BILL ONG HING, DEFINING 
AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 233-35 (2004) (citing the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009; the Refugee Relief Act of 
1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400; the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 
No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952)) (explaining that the Attorney General 
was granted discretionary authority to parole into the United States any alien for 
"emergent reasons" or for "reasons deemed strictly in the public interest"). It is worth 
noting that these acts were promulgated prior to the United States' assent to the 1967 
Protocol. 
80. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506 ("Through the decades of the Cold War, the 
Executive used these tools to admit large numbers of refugees fleeing communist 
persecution, as well as the governments of the Middle East, thus advancing through 
delegated power a particular vision of what constituted a worthy refugee in line with 
the President's prevailing foreign policy concerns."); RING, supra note 79, at 238 
(noting that the Refugee Act of 1980 removed language favoring those fleeing 
communist countries and countries in the Middle East). 
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nondiscrimination.,,81 The law created two distinct groups of 
applicants: those who applied for asylum abroad were designated 
refugees for purposes of the asylum process, and those who applied 
for asylum after reaching the United States were identified as 
"asylees. ,,82 Both groups of applicants seek to be recognized as a 
refugee, because that recognition entitles them to asylum protection 
in this country. 83 Under the Refugee Act, the total number of 
refugees84 that could be admitted each year was controlled by the 
President and Congress. 85 On the other hand, the number of asylees 
admitted each year was theoretically unlimited. 86 
An asylee who is present in the United States must apply for 
asylum within one year of arriving in this country.87 The asylee must 
demonstrate that he or she is entitled to asylum on the grounds that 
she is a "refugee, defined as one who is "unwilling or unable to 
return" home "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.,,88 If an asylee or refugee 
81. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506 (citing Edward M. Kennedy, Refogee Act of 
1980, 15 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 141, 143 (1981) (noting that the Act ensured refuge 
applied not only to refugees from communism or certain areas of the Middle East, but 
also to all who met the standard for refugee under the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol). 
82. HING, supra note 79, at 238. 
83. 8 U.S.C. §§ lI01(a)(42)(A), I 1 58(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R. §208.13 (2010) 
(stating that a claim of past persecution requires that an applicant demonstrate that she 
has suffered persecution in the past "on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and is unable or 
unwilling to return to ... that country"). 
84. The term "refugees" refers to those persons who seek asylum while abroad. See 
HING, supra note 79, at 238. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. Hing notes that "until the 1990s, no more than 5,000 asylum applications were 
approved each year, usually less than a third of all applications." Id. These numbers 
improved through the 1990s and asylum was granted to applicants from countries 
beyond the traditional communist bloc and the Middle Eastern countries, although 
those historically preferred applicants still dominated the asylum landscape. Id. at 
239. 
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 58(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § l208.4(a)(2)(i)(A). Note that the one-year 
deadline may be extended if there are changed circumstances that materially affect the 
applicant's eligibility for asylum, or other extraordinary circumstances related to the 
delay. 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 58(a)(2)(D); see also Svistun v. Holder, 354 F. App'x 872, 873-
74 (5th Cir. 2009). 
88. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 10 1 (a)(42)(A), 1 1 58(b)(1)(A). A claim of past persecution requires that 
an applicant demonstrate that she has suffered persecution in the past "on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion, and is unable or unwilling to return to ... that country." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13. 
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is granted asylum, it is effective for an indefinite period, but it is not 
permanent and remains subject to termination. 89 However, an asylee 
or refugee who is granted asylum may apply for permanent residency 
after one year. 90 
III. EVOLUTION OF TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO 
ASYLUM CLAIMS 
After the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted, asylum was granted, 
for the most part, on a case-by-case basis if an applicant 
demonstrated the requisite persecution or well-founded fear of 
persecution. 91 But some groups were entitled to a presumption in 
favor of a finding of asylum. 92 Two of these groups continue to 
receive the benefit of asylum per se, in the form of a rebuttable 
presumption of persecution or in the form of parolee status upon 
arrival on our shores. The first group, Chinese nationals who claim 
they were subject to "coercive population control" in their home 
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (providing that asylum may be terminated when there is a 
fundamental change in circumstances, including something that would have excepted 
an alien from asylum initially, or when the alien receives protection from a third 
country or the alien's own country); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.l4(e). Asylum can be 
terminated if the recipient no longer has a fear of persecution or there is a change in 
circumstances relating to the original claim, where the alien's life or freedom no 
longer would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion in the country from which deportation or 
removal was withheld. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24. 
90. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1999) (citing INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428-29 n.6 (1987)). 
91. See 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). Recent cases continue to apply the 
same standard. See, e.g., Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(denying asylum to a Christian in Indonesia, who was robbed at work in a mall during 
a bomb threat and lived in an area where churches were being bombed because 
persecution against Christians in Indonesia did not rise to the level of a "pattern or 
practice"); Melaj v. Mukasey, 282 F. App'x 354, 355-56, 360 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(granting an Albanian policeman who refused to obey an order to fire upon 
demonstrators protesting the previous Democratic government in 1996 asylum 
because he suffered past persecution by being detained, tortured, and hunted by 
Albanian police officers within his own country); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 
1188-89, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting asylum to a Bihari based on political opinion 
after he and others refused Bengali citizenship, and the Bengali government removed 
them from their homes, confiscated their property, and relocated them to resettlement 
camps); Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(granting asylum because petitioner was beaten, jailed, and threatened by Armenian 
government officials that she would be jailed or killed in retaliation for her political 
expression if she continued to speak out against corruption in the ruling party). 
92. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42). 
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country, are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they were 
persecuted if they have undergone a forced abortion or involuntary 
sterilization.93 The second group, Cuban nationals who arrive on 
U.S. shores, are routed around the asylum process entirely and are 
fast tracked to parole status and potential citizenship upon arriving on 
U.S. shores. 94 
A. China 
Chinese nationals became beneficiaries of per se asylum legislation 
in 1996 as part of an amendment to the Refugee Act of 1980. 95 
Congress acted in response to pressure from both Chinese refugee 
groups as well as prolife advocates who criticized local practices in 
China of forced abortion and involuntary sterilization to enforce 
population control policies. 96 
China's One Child, One Family policy was part of a broader 
economic development policy.97 As early as 1965, Zhou Enlai called 
for a reduction in the annual rate of population growth. 98 The policy 
93. See id.; supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
94. See 8 U.S.c. § 1255; Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 906. In September 
1994, the United States and Cuba agreed to direct Cuban migration into safe, legal, 
and orderly channels, and to regularly review the migration situation and 
implementation of the accords. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S. 
MIGRATION ACCORD (2000) [hereinafter FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S. MIGRATION 
ACCORD], available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/whaicubalfs_000828_ 
migration_accord.html. The United States committed to process a minimum of 
20,000 Cuban migrants each year, and Cuba pledged to discourage irregular and 
unsafe departures. Id. 
95. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
1 10 1 (a)(42)). Although this group of potential refugees had received enhanced 
consideration from our government on the basis of forced abortion and involuntary 
sterilization as early as 1990, legislation failed before finally becoming codified in 
1996. Policy Implementation with Respect to Nationals of the People's Republic of 
China, Exec. Order No. 12711,55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (April 11, 1990). 
96. HING, supra note 79, at 256. 
97. In re Chang, 20 1. & N. Dec. 38,41 n.2 (B.1.A. 1989); see also Tyrene White, Two 
Kinds of Production: The Evolution of China's Family Planning Policy in the 1980s, 
20 POPULATION & DEV. REv. (SuPP.) 137, 137 (1994). "After years of resisting the 
view held widely outside China that the PRC had to take steps to limit the growth of 
its population, ... the post-Mao reform leadership decided to institute family planning 
programs." In re Chang, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 46 n.2. China's leaders believed that 
"economic modernization goals [would] be unattainable without a low birth rate." Id.; 
see also W X Zhu, The One Child Family Policy, 88 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 
463, 463-64 (2003), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/artic1es/ 
PMCI763112/pdflv088p00463.pdf. 
98. White, supra note 97, at 141. 
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was fIrst introduced in 1979 with the idea that it would be a short-
term solution as the country shifted its cultural bias toward a 
voluntary small-family society.99 The underlying goal, in addition to 
population control, was to improve the standard of living among rural 
residents as a part of broader economic growth. 100 
However, the push to control population growth did not originate in 
China; instead, western countries had been pushing China to take 
steps to control population growth for several years based on 
projections of China's potential for overwhelming growth. 101 
1. China's Population Control Policy 
The State Family Planning Bureau sets overall targets and policies 
for population control, which are then carried out by local 
committees. 102 Women are required to be twenty years of age in 
order to marry; men must be twenty-two years of age. 103 The 
regulations include restrictions on family size, late childbearing, and 
spacing of children when a second or third child is permitted. 104 
Enforcement is strict but uneven; a second child is allowed under 
certain circumstances and is more common in rural areas. 105 The 
99. Therese Hesketh et aI., The Effect a/China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years, 
353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1171 (2005). China approached its goal with education, 
contraceptive counseling, free contraceptive devices, and economic and social 
incentives and disincentives. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 41 n.2. The State 
Council approved the "one is best, two at most" birth-control-policy slogan and 
rewarded couples for limiting themselves to one child while penalizing others for 
three or more births with fines and other economic sanctions. White, supra note 97, at 
143. This shifted to more universal enforcement in the early 1980s and then a 
relaxation of goals in the late 1980s followed by an increase in rhetoric and a move 
for strict family planning in the 19908. Id. at 154. 
100. White, supra note 97, at 145. 
101. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 44. 
102. Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1171. 
103. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 
HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG AND MACAU) (2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/gldrllrislhrrptl2009/eap/135989.htm [hereinafter 
2009 HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA]. 
104. Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1171. 
105. Id.; 2009 HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103. 
The law . . . allows eligible couples to apply for permission to 
have a second child if they meet conditions stipulated in local and 
provincial regulations. The one-child limit [is] more strictly 
applied in urban areas . . .. In most rural areas, the policy was 
more relaxed, with couples permitted to have a second child in 
cases where the first child was a girl. 
2009 HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103. 
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system has rewards and penalties. Rewards include health and 
education benefits, and in some limited instances cash rewards or 
paid time off to recover. 106 Official penalties include fines and 
dismissal from work. 107 Each person in a couple that has an 
unapproved child is required by law to pay a "'social compensation 
fee,' which can reach [ten] times a person's annual disposable 
income." 108 
The Chinese central government has long denied supporting any 
use of force to obtain compliance with birth quotas, but there is 
evidence that citizens, particularly in rural areas, have been subject to 
involuntary sterilization and forced abortion in the past. 109 A recent 
study indicated that with respect to women of reproductive age, 25% 
of women have had at least one abortion, both voluntary and 
forced. 110 While the incidence of forced abortion seems to be less 
than in previous years, the most recent State Department country 
report still reflects the existence of forced abortions. III In recent 
106. In re Chang, 201. & N. Dec. at 40-41. The Chinese government puts intense pressure 
on local birth-planning officials to meet birth-limitation targets. This pressure results 
in instances of physical coercion used to compel persons to submit to abortion or 
sterilization procedures. HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103. The One 
Child, One Family policy has led to families' use of ultrasound technology to identify 
female fetuses and terminate the pregnancy. Although this practice is illegal in China, 
the birth limitations, as well as the traditional preference for male children, 
particularly in rural areas, has led to a government-estimated 120 males born for every 
100 females at the end of2007. This number is alarming when compared to the norm 
of 103 to 107 males for every 100 females. Id. The One Child, One Family policy 
along with this traditional preference for male children continues after birth as a state 
media report stated, "infant mortality rates in rural areas were 27 percent higher for 
girls than boys and that neglect was one factor in the lower survival rate." BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REpORT: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) (2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drVrlslhrrptl2008/eapl1l9037.htm. 
107. See In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 40-41. 
108. 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103. 
109. See In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 40-41. 
110. Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1172. By comparison, 43% of women of 
reproductive age in the United States have had an abortion. Id. 
111. 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103. The 2010 Human Rights Report 
on China stated, 
Regulations requiring women who violate family-planning 
policy to terminate their pregnancies still exist in the 25th, 42nd, 
and 22nd provisions of the Population and Family Control 
Regulation of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces, 
respectively. An additional 10 provinces-Fujian, Guizhou, 
Guangdong, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, 
and Yunnan-require unspecified 'remedial measures' to deal 
with unauthorized pregnancies ... 
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years, enforcement of certain aspects of the population-control policy 
has been relaxed. Couples are not forced to obtain permission to 
have their first child and may often obtain permission for a second 
child. 112 As a practical matter, economic disincentives have not been 
as effective as imagined, and increased freedom of movement makes 
it more difficult to track down violators. 113 
2. China's Population Control Policy Becomes Persecution. 
China's population control policy, including local enforcement 
through forced abortion and involuntary sterilization, was in place for 
approximately seven years before the BIA addressed the issue of 
whether such a policy could serve as a basis for asylum. 114 In May 
1989, the BIA held that China's One Couple, One Child policy was 
not, on its face, persecutive and did not create a well-founded fear of 
persecution, even to the extent that involuntary sterilization might 
occur. 115 The BIA based its decision largely on the fact that the 
policy did not single out an identifiable group. 116 The BIA did not 
address whether the policy was appropriate or whether it should be 
"encouraged or discouraged," focusing instead on whether the 
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RiGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 
HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG AND MACAU) (2011), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drVrlslhrrptl2010/eap/154382.htm. 
112. See Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1171, 1174-75. 
113. Id. at 1175. 
114. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 38. 
115. Id. at 44. Chang, a thirty-three-year-old citizen of the People's Republic of China, 
sought asylum and withholding of deportation. Id. at 39. He did not raise any claims 
about China's family planning policy until his deportation hearing. Id. At that time, 
he claimed that he and his wife had to flee their commune because they had two 
children and did not agree to stop having children, and that "they disagreed with 
China's family planning policies because 'in the countryside, especially in farming 
areas, we need more children. '" Id. He also testified that he was afraid if he returned 
to China, he would be required to undergo sterilization. Id. On appeal, Chang further 
explained that he was ordered to undergo sterilization and that he fled China because 
he had no other choice. Id. 
116. See id. at 43-44. The BIA did not preclude any potential claim based upon 
persecution related to China's coercive family planning policy. Id. at 44. Instead, it 
held that an applicant must establish that the "application of the policy to him was in 
fact persecutive or that he had a well-founded fear" he would be persecuted on 
account of race, religion, national origin, particular social group, or political opinion. 
Id. The BlA explained that an application of the facially neutral policy had to be 
otherwise persecutive. Id. at 45. 
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applicant met the definition of refugee as a separate matter. 117 As 
applied to Chang, the BIA found that he did not satisfy the 
definition. 118 
Less than a month later, protestors seeking democratic reform 
entered Tiananmen Square. 119 Chinese students and citizens rallied in 
support of those protesting in Tiananmen Square. 120 Many Chinese 
citizens who were not part of the formal protest were shot and killed 
by members of the Chinese Army in the surrounding streets, 
seemingly without provocation. 121 Tanks rolling into Tiananmen 
killed bystanders and protesters alike, leaving a pile of crushed and 
crumpled bodies in their wake. 122 
In response, the United States government sought to offer 
protection to those who had openly opposed China's government. 123 
Population control, a policy that had largely escaped political scrutiny 
in the United States just a year earlier, was recast based on public 
perception of the horrible human-rights abuses by China. 124 On April 
11, 1990, President George H.W. Bush issued Executive Order 
12711, which directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
State to exercise their authority under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to protect citizens of the Peoples' Republic of China 
who were currently present in the United States so that they were not 
117. Id. at 47. The BIA also suggested that choosing to afford protection to those subject 
to mandatory sterilization under China's family-planning policy was a legislative 
matter. Id. 
118. Id. Arguably, the BIA was focused solely on whether the applicant could satisfy the 
requisite test, not whether the underlying claim had some political currency in this 
country. See id. 
119. Kristof, supra note 72. 
120. Id. 
121. Mengbai Zhong, White Dawn, CHINA NEWS DIGEST (June 8, 1999), 
http://museums.cnd.orglCND-GlobaIlCND-Globa1.99.2ndlCND-Globa1.99-06-
07.html. Zhong and his friend, Yefu took to the streets on the eve of June 3, 1989, to 
witness and document what was happening. Id. Zhong writes of being repeatedly 
shot at by the Chinese Army for nonviolent protests, seeing many bodies and injured 
citizens, and witnessing the tanks entering Tiananmen Square. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Exec. Order No. 12711,55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (Apr. 11, 1990). "In response to a foreign 
crisis, the President can authorize the entry of particular groups or extend temporary 
protection to members of such groups who may already be in the United States .... " 
Kai Wu Chan v. Reno, 916 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 8 U.S.c. §§ 
1157, 1182(f) (2006». 
124. See Jacques de Lisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A 
"Sinical" Look at the Use of us. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses 
Abroad, 52 DEPAULL. REv. 473, 481-82 (2002). 
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forced to return to China. 125 President Bush also directed that 
"enhanced consideration" be given to individuals from "any country" 
who expressed a fear of persecution upon return to their country 
related to that country's policy of forced abortion. 126 While the 
events of May 1990 were not connected to China's population control 
policy, the President took the opportunity to address the very same 
policy that had been at issue in the BIA's decision in In re Chang. 
In this political atmosphere, Congress amended the Refugee Act of 
1980 to specifically provide that a person who was subject to 
persecution for resistance to a coercive popUlation control (CPC) 
program was eligible for asylum.127 This new protection was a result, 
at least in part, of a coalition of Chinese asylum supporters and right-
to-life proponents. 128 Congress created recognition for two new 
groups of refugees. First, Congress afforded per se status to any 
person who had suffered forced abortion or sterilization. 129 These 
asylum applicants did not have to prove any resistance or opposition 
to a CPC program beyond being involuntarily aborted or sterilized. 130 
Congress also afforded protection to persons who were subject to 
persecution for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure, were 
subject to persecution for other resistance to a CPC program, or who 
held a well-founded fear of future persecution for one of these 
125. Exec. Order No. 12711,55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (Apr. 11, 1990). 
126. Id. 
127. 8 u.s.c. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006). The statute provides that 
a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo 
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or 
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a 
coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have 
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who 
has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo 
such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, 
or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of 
persecution on account of political opinion. 
Id. Initially, asylum was limited to 10,000 applicants per year under this per se 
protection, but that numerical limit was removed in 2005 when the REAL ID ACT 
was passed. See 8 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). 
128. HINo, supra note 79, at 256. 
129. See 8 U.S.c. § 1l01(a)(42)(A)-(B). While the language of the statute did not limit 
itself to Chinese nationals, as a practical matter, Chinese nationals are the only group 
that seek asylum under these provisions. See Kyle R. Rabkin, The Zero-Child Policy: 
How the Board of Immigration Appeals Discriminates Against Unmarried Asylum-
Seekers Fleeing Coercive Family Planning Measures, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 965, 966 
(2007). 
130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(42)(A)-(B). 
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reasons. 131 Congress enacted this legislation in direct response to the 
BIA's decision in In re Chang. 132 
Almost immediately, the BIA determined that the new per se 
protection offered to victims of coercive physical procedures could 
be extended to a victim's spouse. 133 The extended protection arose 
out of a concession by the Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) that spouses of victims of forced abortions or sterilizations 
were allowed to stand in the shoes of those victims for asylum 
purposes. 134 The BIA then completely refused to extend this 
preferred status to fathers of aborted unborn children where the father 
and mother were not in a legally recognized marriage. 135 
From 1997 to 2007, federal courts followed this interpretation of 
section 1101(a)(42)(A),136 although it was frequently questioned.137 
The courts struggled to apply the statute to other situations, 
particularly those involving men who were not in legally recognized 
marriages, because the underlying basis for the BIA's decision was 
never clearly explained. 138 The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals took issue with the BIA's bright-line rule and extended the 
per se presumption to a divorced male asylee whose unborn child had 
been forcibly aborted and to a male asylee who had participated in a 
traditional marriage because China's population-control program 
131. Id.; In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997). 
132. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 922. In re Chang was then superseded by the BIA's 
decision in In re X-P-T-, where the BIA recognized that an alien who has been forced 
to abort a pregnancy, undergo involuntary sterilization, or been persecuted for 
resistance to coercive population control has suffered past persecution on account of 
political opinion, and qualifies as a refugee. Id. at 917. 
133. See id. at 918-19. 
134. Id. at 917-18. 
135. See Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 2004). Marriages in China 
must be registered to be recognized. Id. Many marriages are not registered because 
the couple is not yet old enough to marry under the marriage law. Id. Thus, the 
couple may choose to be married in a traditional ceremony, but the Chinese 
government will not recognize the marriage as valid until the couple is the appropriate 
age and registered. Id. 
136. See In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (Att'y Gen. 2008); Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2005). 
137. See, e.g., Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 399-405 (2d Cir. 
2007) (en bane); Junshao Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006); Shi 
Liang Lin, 416 F.3d at 187; Kui Rang Ma, 361 F.3d at 559-61. 
138. See, e.g., Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221,225 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that 
BIA did not offer a basis for concluding that spouses were entitled to per se protection 
from coercive family planning). 
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would not permit the applicant and his fiance to marry based on their 
age. 139 
In 2007, the interpretation of section 1l01(a)(42)(A) shifted again. 
The Second Circuit remanded a case back to the BIA to explain its 
position that husbands of women who were forcibly aborted or 
sterilized were entitled to per se asylum but unmarried partners of 
those women were not. 140 When the case returned to the Second 
Circuit, the court, sitting en banc, held that the statute was not 
ambiguous and it clearly applied only to the victim of forced abortion 
or sterilization. 141 In June 2008 the Attorney General weighed in, 
taking the position that applicants who did not themselves suffer a 
forced abortion or sterilization must demonstrate persecution on the 
basis of other resistance on a case-by-case basis. 142 
Since that time, the BIA and most circuit courts have refused to 
consider the abortion or sterilization of a man's wife or mother of his 
unborn child when considering his asylum claim. 143 Instead, the BIA 
and the courts have looked at two things: whether the applicant can 
demonstrate "resistance," and whether the applicant suffered 
persecution on account of that resistance. 144 Thus, where it would 
once perhaps have been appropriate to consider an applicant's 
connection to a forced abortion or sterilization, this swing in policy 
has meant that applicants must stand solely on their own experience, 
even under circumstances where their future child has been aborted. 
Courts are, in essence, bifurcating claims of persecution and 
refusing to consider the abortion of a male applicant's unborn child in 
conjunction with any other resistance. 145 In Ming Shi Chen v. Bd. of 
139. Junshao Zhang, 434 F.3d at 999 (citing Kui Rong Ma, 361 F.3d at 559-61). But see 
Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 232-34 (holding that unmarried partners are not entitled 
to per se protection, even when prevented from marrying by family-planning policy). 
140. Shi Liang Lin, 416 F.3d at 192. 
141. Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 299-305. 
142. In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (Att'y Gen. 2008). 
143. See, e.g., Shun Guan Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 366 F. App'x 272, 274 (2d CiT. 
2010) (holding that helping his wife hide to avoid a forced abortion and his payment 
of a fine did not rise to the level of persecution); Yue Ping Lin v. Holder, 359 F. 
App'x 230, 232 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Lin failed to establish that he suffered 
any independent, personal persecution qualifying him for relief). 
144. See, e.g., Jia Duan Dong v. Holder, 587 F.3d 8,12 (1st Cir. 2009). 
145. See, e.g., Hao Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 323 (7th CiT. 2006) (Rovner, J., 
dissenting). The dissent in Zhu astutely noted that "the forced abortion inflicted upon 
Zhu's partner may not be a fact that entitles Zhu to a per se presumption of past 
persecution ... but neither can it be ignored as though it were entirely umelated to the 
persecution at issue." Id.; see also Zhi Zhi Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App'x 528, 530 
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Immigration Appeals, the Second Circuit held that "the fact that an 
individual's spouse or partner has been forced to have an abortion 
'does not, on its own, constitute resistance to coercive family 
planning policies. ",146 However, in Jia Shan Ou v. Mukasey, the 
Second Circuit seemed to indicate that Ou, a former husband could 
demonstrate past persecution where his wife was sterilized but only 
because he was himself fined, arrested, detained, and beaten while in 
custody, even though Ou was ultimately denied asylum based on the 
fact he was now divorced and had lived in China for eight years 
without incident. 147 
The BIA has held that the tenn "'resistance' includes, but is not 
limited to, 'expressions of general opposition, attempts to interfere 
with enforcement of government policy ... and other overt forms of 
resistance to the requirements of the family planning law. '" 148 But it 
is telling what courts found to not constitute resistance. For example, 
impregnating one's girlfriend, in direct contravention of China's 
family planning policy, is not resistance. 149 This is presumably 
because the applicant cannot demonstrate it was intentional and not 
just an accident. Had it been a purposeful impregnation in protest of 
population-control policy, then it would seem to most certainly 
satisfy the concept of "overt form[] of resistance to the requirements 
of [] family planning.,,15o Also, failure to surrender one's girlfriend 
or wife voluntarily is not resistance because hiding is not an overt 
fonn of resistance. lSI In Bi Qi Liu v. Holder, the Second Circuit held 
that in order to demonstrate persecution, a father would have to 
demonstrate he was "arrested, mistreated, or physically harmed.,,152 
So, even if a male applicant could demonstrate resistance, absent his 
(7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the different approaches to male applicants whose partners 
have been subject to a forced abortion). 
146. Ming Shi Chen v. B.I.A.. 247 F. App'x 304, 305 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Shi Liang 
Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 313 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
147. See Jia Shan au v. Mukasey, 260 F. App'x 371, 372-73 & 373 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). 
This means Ou was unable to receive asylum based on past persecution alone. See id. 
at 372. The wisdom ofthis position is questionable, considering that those who abort 
and do not attempt to have more children will not be subject to future persecution. 
148. Xiao Fei Dong v. Mukasey, 307 F. App'x 547, 549 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting In re 
S-L-L, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (B.LA. 2006)). However, in 2005, the Third Circuit 
found that the standard was met where a doctor wrote articles critical of birth control 
measures and publicized a practice of hospital infanticide. Yun Jun Cao v. Att'y Gen. 
of the U.S., 407 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2005). 
149. Cheng Lin v. Holder, 314 F. App'x 371, 372 (2d Cir. 2009). 
150. Xiao Fei Dong, 307 F. App'x at 549. 
151. See id. 
152. Bi Qi Liu v. Holder, 349 F. App'x 664, 665 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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arrest or some physical harm to his own person, it would appear that 
he can never demonstrate he has been persecuted when his child is 
forcibly aborted. IS3 Today, this application of asylum statutes 
remains the status quo with respect to Chinese men. IS4 
B. Cuba and the Cuban Acijustment Act 
In 1959, Fulgencio Batista was overthrown in a coup orchestrated 
by Fidel Castro and Emesto "Che" Guevara. 155 Castro's rise to 
power marked the beginning of communism and the end of 
democratic freedoms for this U.S. island neighbor; it also marked 
mass Cuban migration to the United States. 156 The first waves of 
Cuban refugees were comprised of predominately white or Latino, 
educated, landowners and their families who were directly affected 
by Cuba's shifting political landscape. 157 
Legislation protecting Cubans who might have otherwise entered 
the United States illegally was first passed in 1966 in response to this 
mass migration. 158 The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 provided a 
separate mechanism by which Cuban entrants could secure the right 
to permanent residence in the United States. 1S9 The Act provides, in 
pertinent part, that 
153. See id. 
154. See, e.g., Shun Guan Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 366 F. App'x 272, 274 (2d Cir. 
2010); Yue Ping Lin v. Holder, 359 F. App'x 230, 231-32 (2d Cir. 2010); Jia Duan 
Dong v. Holder, 587 F.3d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2009); Xiao Fei Dong, 307 F. App'x at 
549; Cheng Lin, 314 F. App'x at 372; Bi Qi Liu, 349 F. App'x at 665. 
155. Roland Estevez, Note, Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and 
Helms-Burton: Adding Insult to Injury, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1273,1273-74 (2002). 
156. Id. at 1274 (citing PORTES & BACH, supra note 74, at 85). 
157. Id. These immigrants have been identified as arriving in three distinct stages-ofthose 
arriving between 1959 and 1973, most moved freely, either by permission or 
agreement of the Cuban and United States governments. See id. Just under one 
million immigrants arrived from Cuba during this time period. See id. 
158. Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 
(2006)). 
159. Id. At the outset of this discussion, the difference in statutory mechanisms employed 
to resolve the issue of Cuban migration must be noted. Cubans, unlike Chinese 
victims of coercive population control, are not granted a presumption of persecution 
during asylum proceedings. See Estevez, supra note 155, at 1290-91. Instead, there 
is a separate system in place that offers Cuban nationals who enter our country in a 
similar manner, and arguably for similar reasons, far more immediate protection than 
those who seek asylum. See id. at 1292. However, while acknowledging these 
distinctions, the larger conversation about treatment of groups of asylum seekers is 
still a valid undertaking. See id. at 1292-95. 
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the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and 
who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the 
United States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been 
physically present in the United States for at least one year, 
may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his 
discretion ... to that of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if the alien makes an application for 
such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an 
immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for 
permanent residence. 160 
Because Cubans are generally paroled into the United States, they 
can take advantage of this provision and are not required to 
demonstrate they suffered persecution or otherwise satisfy the 
definition of refugee. 161 
Cubans who reach United States soil are generally paroled into the 
United States. 162 Once present in the United States for the requisite 
time, a Cuban may seek to adjust his or her status to that of a 
permanent resident. 163 Even Cubans who attempt to reach the United 
States through the Florida Straits and are interdicted are entitled to 
have their asylum claims heard, but are not automatically entitled to 
parole in the United States. 164 Still, they are more likely to have their 
asylum claims granted than Haitians or other Caribbean nationals. 165 
No other group of aliens is afforded such preferential status. 
In 1980, there was a shift in immigration flow from Cuba, marked 
by the Carter Administration's invitation to Cubans seeking refuge to 
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006). 
161. Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 906-07. 
162. See id. at 907. 
In September 1994 the United States and Cuba agreed to direct 
Cuban migration into safe, legal and orderly channels, and to 
regularly review the migration situation and implementation of the 
accords .... The U.S. committed to process a minimum of20,000 
Cuban migrants each year. [And,] Cuba pledged to discourage 
irregular and unsafe departures. 
FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S. MIGRATION ACCORD, supra note 94. 
163. See 8 U.S.c. § 1255. 
164. See Donald Brown, Comment, Crooked Straits: Maritime Smuggling of Humans from 
Cuba to the United States, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 273, 277 (2002). 
165. See Arteaga, supra note 10, at 510-11, 541 (noting instances where Haitians, 
Jamaicans, and Cubans in similar circumstances are treated differently, even where all 
of them reach United States soil). The United States' policy with respect to Cuba 
became heavily criticized in the latter part of the twentieth century, particularly as it 
was compared to the treatment of Haitians seeking asylum. Cox & Rodriguez, supra 
note 78, at 507. 
2011] A Fine Line, Redefined 675 
come to the United States. 166 The "Marielitos,,,167 as they came to be 
known, included Cubans who were economically, ethnically, and 
socially distinct from those who emigrated in the early years of 
Castro's political regime. 168 
For the most part, the United States continued to accept Cuban 
refugees freely, and those refugees continued to receive the benefits 
of the Cuban Adjustment Act until 1994. 169 At that time, Cuba and 
the United States formalized a process 170 by which Cubans interdicted 
at sea could be returned to Cuba or held at Guantanamo Bay, and a 
limited number of Cubans would be permitted to immigrate directly 
from Cuba. 171 Those who reached the United States, on the other 
hand, had reached a sanctuary from exile and deportation. The at-sea 
interdiction policy, which is still in force today, is designated "wet 
foot, dry foot" based on the disparate treatment afforded successful 
escapees from those interdicted at sea. 172 
IV. CULTURE, POLICY, BACKLASH, AND VALUE 
JUDGMENTS. 
Assessing the impact of per se asylum preferences requires an 
examination of the underlying cultural and policy implications this 
166. Estevez, supra note 155, at 1275. This policy was known as "open hearts and open 
anns" policy. PORTES & BACH, supra note 74, at 87. In April 1980, over 150,000 
Cubans boarded boats in Mariel Harbor and journeyed to the United States. Cox & 
Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507. 
167. They were known as MarieJitos because the port was their point of departure from 
Cuba. Estevez, supra note 155, at 1275. 
168. HING, supra note 79, at 257. In fact, many Marielitos "initially explained their 
departure as the result of food scarcity, or the desire to earn more money in the United 
States." Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507. 
169. See Estevez, supra note 155, at 1275-76. 
170. Id. 
171. FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S. MIGRATION ACCORD,supra note 94. 
172. Id. The shift from "open hearts" to "at-sea interdiction" was a slow one, and was 
marked more by external forces than the reality that the type of refugee fleeing Cuba 
had changed. See Alberto J. Perez, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring 
Controversy Between Cubans, Haitians, and the United States Immigration Policy, 28 
NOVA L. REv. 437, 445 (2004). In the 1980s and 1990s there was a general public 
outcry of the disparate treatment of Haitians and Cubans who arrived in the United 
States. ld. at 454-55. That, in addition to waning public support for the continued 
migration of Cubans to South Florida, are the predominant reasons the shift occurred. 
Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 508-09. Even with this movement, Cubans still 
receive preferential treatment-both at sea and once they arrive in our borders. See 
Stephen H. Legornsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program, 18 INT'L J. 
REFUGEE L. 677, 684 (2006). Unlike Haitians, "Cubans who are interdicted at sea are 
advised of their right to apply for asylum." Id. 
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type of protection affords. The universal definition of refugee is 
highly politicized, based on a Eurocentric-type refugee, to the 
detriment of a broader class of refugees from less-developed 
nations. 173 This definition favors asylum seekers fleeing communist 
regimes to the detriment of Third World refugees, whose "flight 
[was] more often prompted by natural disaster, war, or broadly-based 
political and economic turmoil than by 'persecution,' at least as that 
term is understood in the European context.,,174 To some extent, this 
illustrates why Cubans receive preferential treatment while the plight 
of Haitian refugees avoiding political upheaval, natural disasters, and 
economic deprivation has caused the United States to reach out 
beyond its borders to prevent an influx of asylees from that country. 
The nations that decide who is a refugee for purposes of asylum 
make value judgments. These value judgments are rife with our own 
cultural views about immigration, poverty, politics, war, and socially 
charged issues such as abortion, domestic violence, and race. 175 
"Even in the area of asylum, our policies are implemented in ways 
that are not generous toward those who would not fit the real image 
of who an American is.,,176 Lost in the inherent definition of refugee 
is the idea that those who are persecuted-for whatever reason-
should be afforded asylum.177 Thus, the definition should be read 
more fully than it currently is in many countries, including the United 
States. The problem is that while targeted legislation can fill gaps in 
the definition of refugee, too often such legislation reinforces 
disparities in the treatment of those who seek asylum. 178 
In the United States, these definitions and concepts-who is a 
refugee, who is entitled to presumptive asylum, and who is entitled to 
parole without proof-must be balanced with our notion of "equal 
protection." 179 Equal protection mandates that determinations of 
asylum should require that '" distinctions between different classes of 
173. Nessel, supra note 7, at 635. 
174. James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 
HARv. INT'L L.J. 129, 162 (1990). 
175. See HING, supra note 79, at 257. 
176. Id. 
177. See, e.g., Refugee Act of1980, 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(2006». 
178. See HING, supra note 79, at 257-58. 
179. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). In some ways this is an 
oversimplification of a complex issue. For the purposes of this discussion, the 
concept of "equal protection" refers broadly to the legal concept our country has 
embraced in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
at the macro level and has applied judicially and legislatively at lower levels. See 
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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persons must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some 
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike. '" 180 Yet, one commentator has stated that 
courts have developed doctrines and drawn lines that 
distinguish between state- and federally sponsored alienage 
discrimination, between deprivations of constitutional and 
sub constitutional rights, between the rights afforded to 
permanent resident aliens and those afforded to 
undocumented or other nonresident aliens, between 
economic and political forms of alienage discrimination, and 
between discriminatory action taken by different branches 
or agencies of the federal government. 181 
The Refugee Act of 1980 recognized discriminatory practices in 
the application of asylum policy, and attempted to resolve those 
practices to create reasonable distinctions and to treat similarly 
circumstanced asylum seekers alike. 182 While the Refugee Act of 
1980 took a large step forward in formalizing asylum practices and 
allowing a more equitable system of application, problems of 
disparate treatment still remain. 183 This disparate treatment is 
heightened by legislatively enacted per se asylum protection for 
Cubans and Chinese nationals. 184 These legislatively created 
preferences and rebuttable presumptions of persecution violate 
notions of equal protection and undermine the purpose of the Refugee 
Act of 1980; 185 further, they are a vestige of old policies, and 
continue to perpetuate misconceptions about those who seek 
protection at U.S. borders as well as those already in the United 
States who are still perceived as different. 186 
180. Kai Wu Chan v. Reno, 916 F. Supp. 1289, 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Francis v. 
INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
181. BOSNIAK, supra note 17, at 49 (footnotes omitted). 
182. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
183. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94. 
185. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506 (citing Kennedy, supra note 81, at 143). 
186. In the context of race, for example, the impact of asylum protection that distinguishes 
based on race, and preference for "sameness," reinforces "domestic subordination of 
the same racial minority groups who are excluded. . . . Exclusion in immigration laws 
must be viewed as an integral part of a larger mosaic of racial discrimination in 
American society." Nessel, supra note 7, at 694 (citing KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING 
THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION 
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For example, Chinese men and women are treated differently in 
terms of the persecution they suffer as the result of losing a child. 
The woman who carried the child, by virtue of being subject to the 
procedure that ends a fetus's existence, is deemed worthy of asylum 
without proving anything beyond the fact that she suffered an 
unwanted abortion; 187 she must simply claim it was forced. 188 The 
father of the child, on the other hand, must show that he was 
persecuted for other activities. 189 It is not enough that a father 
actively attempted to avoid the abortion by trying to hide his wife, 
arguing with cadre officials, or otherwise trying to prevent the loss. 190 
He must demonstrate he suffered a separate and distinct episode of 
persecution aside from the abortion itself. 191 This disparity is highly 
problematic because it does not recognize that the father has as much 
a claim to the loss of his child as the mother. 192 
The reality, however, is that this disparity reflects our own societal 
judgments about the impact the loss of a fetus has on a father. Our 
society views abortion as a woman's issue, particularly where 
abortion is elective. 193 Although fathers have legal rights in adoption 
decisions and those involving matters like frozen embryos, our 
country has not extended that legal protection to putative fathers in 
the context of abortion. 194 Fathers who experience the loss of a child 
LAWS 153 (2007)). On some level, "[i]mmigration law allows the United States to do 
at its borders what it cannot do within them." JOHNSON, supra, at 89. 
187. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-4611, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 
28465, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 13,2006). 
188. /d.; In re J-S-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (Att'y Gen. 2008). 
189. See In re J-S-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 520. 
190. See, e.g., Bi Qi Liu v. Holder, 349 F. App'x 664, 665 (2d Cir. 2009); Cheng Lin v. 
Holder, 314 F. App'x 371, 372 (2d Cir. 2009); Xiao Fei Dong v. Mukasey, 307 F. 
App'x 547, 549 (2d Cir. 2009); Hao Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 323 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
191. See, e.g., Bi Qi Liu, 394 F. App'x at 665; Cheng Lin, 314 F. App'x at 372; Xiao Fei 
Dong, 307 F. App'x at 549; Hao Zhu, 465 F.3d at 323. 
192. This argument does not try to ignore the obvious, that a woman has undergone an 
invasive physical procedure where the man has not. But as noted, infra notes 208-09 
and accompanying text, women who are required to submit to insertion of an 
intrauterine device are not presumptively entitled to asylum and women who are 
required to submit to frequent physical exams to check for pregnancy are not either. 
Instead, a woman must be forcibly required to end a pregnancy for the presumption to 
attach. 
193. See Catherine T. Coyle, Men and Abortion: A Review of Empirical Reports 
Concerning the Impact of Abortion on Men, 3 INTERNET J. MENTAL HEALTH (2007), 
http://www.ispub.comlostia/index.php?xm1FilePath=journals/ijrnh/vo13n21 
abortion.xml. 
194. See id. 
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via miscarriage do not fare much better, even though research 
suggests they evidence a higher degree of difficulty coping than 
women. 195 Recent research indicates that men suffer from the same 
postabortion psychological issues that women do. 196 Men report 
feeling depression, anxiety, helplessness, and guilt. 197 This not only 
impacts the couple but has implications for the parents' relationship 
with their extended family as well. 198 
Currently, a woman in the United States may have an abortion, and 
the father has no legal rights to prevent it. 199 If a woman miscarries, 
then often a father's feelings are not the paramount concern. While it 
is true that a woman carrying a child may bond with it faster, the 
reality is that for a man who wants a child, the loss is just as palpable, 
particularly where the loss was not only involuntary but forced. 200 
Assigning these roles to Chinese fathers does them a disservice 
because this country does not engage in or allow forced abortion, and 
so there is no social construct to address it. It does more than simply 
impose a value judgment on the role of the father in Chinese society: 
it fails to recognize the oppressive atmosphere and official capacity in 
which forced abortions are carried out. 
Chinese men have been cast as opportunists, taking advantage of 
the option to travel to the United States and leave their families 
195. See id.; Marya Burgess, How Miscarriage Can Hit Very Hard, BBC NEWS (June 19, 
2006), http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/5082442.stm (noting that the impact on men goes 
unrecognized and that men are stuck between a rock and hard place, socially not 
permitted to be too emotional or too stoic). Men's grief can also take a different form, 
with a man trying to problem-solve, take action, gather facts, or simply avoid the grief 
by working. After a Miscarriage: Surviving Emotionally, AM. PREGNANCY ASS'N, 
http://www .americanpregnancy .org/pregnancyloss/mcsurvivingemotionally .html (last 
updated Oct. 2008) [hereinafter After a Miscarriage]. 
196. Coyle, supra note 193. 
197. Id. 
198. Francine De Montigny et aI., A Baby Has Died: The Impact of Perinatal Loss on 
Family Social Networks, 28 1. OBSTETRIC GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 151, 
152-53 (1999) (reporting that family members' quality and quantity of ties with their 
network were profoundly affected by prenatal loss and many suffered the permanent 
loss of relationships with friends, colleagues, or extended family members). 
199. See Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-69 (1976) (holding that 
the state is not required to notify or obtain permission from a woman's husband when 
she seeks an abortion). 
200. See After a Miscarriage, supra note 195 (explaining that "[a] woman can begin 
bonding [with a baby] from the moment she has a positive pregnancy test"); Coyle, 
supra note 193 (describing the feelings of "worthlessness," "voicelessness," and 
"emasculation" a man experiences after learning that his girlfriend had an abortion 
without informing him). 
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behind. 201 This, again, fails to recognize a reality of immigration that 
has been present for decades. Our current legislative policy toward 
China's CPC fails to take into account a cultural norm that, 
historically, men immigrate first and then their families follow. 202 
In her concurrence in In Re C-Y-Z, 203 Board Member Rosenberg 
noted the following: 
The fact that respondent preceded his family is no different 
from the cultural practice followed by hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants and refugees who fled anti-Semitic 
pogroms in czarist Russia, famine in Ireland, [ or] fascism in 
Germany. . .. The men come first; the husband and father 
forges the way for the wife and children, who follow when 
he has established a place to live and a means to support 
them. In an ideal world, perhaps she who has suffered the 
more egregious physical persecution should be the first to 
leave the zone of danger and be afforded refuge. In any 
event, the applicant's conformity with historical and cultural 
norms in preceding his wife and family certainly has no 
bearing either on the merits of his asylum claim or on the 
exercise of discretion. 204 
Rosenberg hit upon an important consideration in deciding what 
type of asylum claims are entitled to per se relief. More than one 
Chinese father has been vilified in a court opinion for leaving his 
wife and children behind to come to the United States. 205 Oddly, the 
201. Patricia Wen, Law Offers Chinese a Path to US Policy Giving Asylum to Those 
Facing Coerced Birth Control Benefits Mostly Men, Bas. GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at 
Bl ("Of the 10,000 Chinese people who have obtained political asylum based on 
China's one-child policy, federal statistics show, three out of four are men."). 
202. ld. (noting that most men who are granted asylum petition to have the rest of their 
family join them). Even our immigration statutes contemplate derivative status and 
family members arriving at different times depending upon the circumstances. See, 
e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 207.7 (2010). In fact, immediate relatives of United States citizens 
brought in through family immigration laws account for more than 40% of the annual 
flow of legal immigrants to this country. RANDALL MONGER, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2009 
3 tb1.2 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ 
Iprjr_2009.pd£ Twenty-eight percent of legal immigrants to the United States are 
spouses brought by a legal resident and 8.7% are children brought by a parent who is 
a legal immigrant. ld. 
203. 211. & N. Dec. 915,927 (B.I.A. 1997) (concurring opinion). 
204. ld. 
205. See, e.g., Yin Fang Lin v. Holder, No. 09-2398-ag, 2010 WL 3733910, at "'I (2d Cir. 
Sept. 27,2010). 
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wife will likely not be subject to further persecution when he is gone 
because she is not likely to get pregnant in his absence. 206 Because 
the bar is now set even higher, the applicants must deviate from what 
may be deemed culturally appropriate by sending mothers ahead. 207 
This makes little sense because the per se presumption of 
persecution for women, who are forcibly aborted, contemplates more 
than a physical invasion of a woman's person. Generally, an 
abortion, if performed correctly, does not impede a woman from 
becoming pregnant again. The real loss, and the loss that the 
protective statute inherently recognizes, is the loss of that child. 208 
Chinese women are not entitled to per se asylum from temporary 
sterilization, such as forced insertion of an intrauterine device, even 
though this too is an invasive procedure; nor are they entitled to per 
se asylum when they are subject to monthly exams to check for 
illegal pregnancy. 209 
If the child is desired by both parents, then the harm extends to 
both parents regardless of the legal status of their relationship. Yet, a 
father is precluded from relying on the loss of his unborn child to 
support an asylum claim while a mother's sole basis for receiving a 
rebuttable presumption of asylum is the loss of the same child. 210 
While the mother may suffer physically as well, the emotional and 
psychological harm extends to both parents. However, this harm is 
not recognized by current legislation or policies. 211 
This juxtaposition of parental protection is at odds with the 
Refugee Act of 1980 because the Act recognized the fundamental 
nature of the right to procreate. 212 The right to procreate must be 
shared by both parents, and should be reflected in protection 
extended to those who suffer persecution based on their desire to 
206. Rabkin, supra note 129, at 970-71 (discussing how couples who have "unapproved 
children" often face high fines, forced abortions, and sterilization). 
207. See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 927. 
208. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42) (2006) (stating that "a person who has been forced to abort 
a pregnancy . . . shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political 
opinion"). 
209. See id. (omitting a presumption of persecution for temporary sterilization or routine 
exams to check for illegal pregnancy). 
210. See id. 
211. See, e.g., id. 
212. Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides that men and women have the right to marry and to found a family. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 21, art. 16(1). It goes on to 
recognize that the "family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State." Id. art. 16(3). 
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procreate. Thus, this failure to extend protection to similarly situated 
individuals runs afoul of our notions of eaual protection213 as well as 
the intent of the Refugee Act itself. 2 I It also carries with it 
stereotypes U.S. culture has adopted and does not consider whether 
fathers are treated similarly in China. 215 
If we are to recognize that a single event can satisfy the definition 
of refugee for the purposes of asylum, then we should not lay 
judgment on the length of time it takes an applicant to arrive in the 
United States or how a family unit decides who should come first. 
Even in the case of a boyfriend or former spouse, the loss of his 
unborn child should be the triggering event, not the procedure 
performed. If Congress feels that such an application is untenable, 
then the requirements imposed upon Chinese men whose unborn 
children have been forcibly aborted should also be imposed upon the 
women who carried those unborn children. 216 This would impose the 
same requirement, "other resistance," on both classes of claimants 
and establish equitable treatment for the same harm. 217 
The treatment of Cuban and Haitian nationals offers another view 
of the problem with extending preferential legislative protection to 
one group of potential asylees without taking a sufficiently broad 
view of the implications. It also illuminates why, at a minimum, such 
legislation should be revisited with regularity instead of simply 
adapted to shifting politics on an ad hoc basis. 
While there may have been a justification for treating the first 
waves of Cuban immigrants differently because of the sudden shift in 
government, modem waves of Cuban and Haitian refugees are more 
alike than different: they typically seek to escape poverty as well as 
government oppression. The difference in their treatment is based on 
213. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text. 
216. Theoretically, this is not a one-time harm. See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 
915-16 (B.I.A. 1997). If a couple continues to become pregnant in violation of 
coercive population control, a woman may be subject to forced abortion, and both 
may face the loss of yet another unborn child. See id. While the woman may 
disproportionately bear the physical and psychological burden, it should not diminish 
the harm suffered by the man simply because he cannot become pregnant. See id. at 
920-23,926--27 (concurring opinion). This is particularly true in this context, where 
the question is not who suffered the physical act, but who has suffered persecution at 
the hands of a government or other group. See id. at 926--27. 
217. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-2008 § 601(a)(l), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101 (a)(42)). 
2011] A Fine Line, Redefined 683 
historic conceptions and value judgments placed on those entering 
that have not withstood the test oftime.218 
The first wave of Cubans were white, middle-aged, and well-
educated. 219 They were the product of a society that was pre-Castro 
and anti-Castro. 220 They fled Communist tyranny in family units. 221 
The second wave, who arrived from 1965 to 1970, were still mostly 
white and educated, working class, and came in family units. 222 It 
was this group of immigrants that Congress sought to protect, 
because they were "like us" and deemed capable of assimilation. 223 
Again, we judged them by their sameness and enacted legislation to 
protect them. When the next waves of Cuban nationals arrived, they 
became less like us, and the public was less interested in 
accommodating them. 224 
In 1980, the Marielitos, who were the last big wave of refugees 
from Cuba, were blue collar, less educated, and younger. 225 Many 
did not come with families. 226 Many spoke only Spanish; half were 
black. 227 Many expressed economic reasons for seeking refuge in the 
United States rather than expressing a basis recognized by the 
Refugee Act of 1980.228 These people, in many instances, were also 
the first generation to have grown up under Fidel Castro. 229 They had 
not experienced anything other than communism, and fled, not to 
escape political persecution, but to try their luck in America or to 
escape food scarcity in Cuba. 230 These circumstances are not 
markedly different from illegal immigrants fleeing to the United 
States to avoid similar hardships in many countries around the world, 
including Haiti. 231 In spite of this shift, Congress did nothing to 
adjust the requirements for Cuban refugees.232 Even in the face of 
218. See infra notes 219-23. 




223. Mirando por los Dios, supra note 74, at 910-11. 
224. See id. at 914; HINo, supra note 79, at 256. 
225. HINo, supra note 79, at 257. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See Mirando por los Dios, supra note 74, at 912-13. In fact, many Marielitos initially 
explained their departure as a result of food scarcity or desire to earn more money in 
United States. See id.; Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507. 
229. See Arteaga, supra note 10, at 513 n.37. 
230. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507. 
231. Arteaga, supra note 10, at 545. 
232. PORTES & BACH, supra note 74, at 85; Mirando por los Dios, supra note 74, at 907. 
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comparison with Haitian refugees who were seeking to escape 
political turmoil surrounding the Duvaliers' ruthless reign,233 the 
legislative protections stood. The scale has remained tipped so far in 
favor of Cubans it makes Congress look ridiculous. 
When Clinton entered into an accord with Cuba to reduce the flow 
of Cuban asylum seekers, both countries agreed to the wet foot, dry 
foot policy. 234 Regrettably, this policy created a whole new class of 
presumptively protected Cubans-those that made it to shore-which 
has created its own problems.235 Now, in addition to treating Cubans 
differently than other asylum seekers, there is even a distinction 
between Cubans who plant one foot on United States soil and those 
who are interdicted just off shore, regardless of whether either person 
has a valid underlying claim for asylum. 236 
The purposeful protections enumerated in the Cuban Adjustment 
Act have outlived their usefulness and do not reflect the realities of 
today.237 Neither the nature of those who seek protection upon arrival 
on our shores, nor the competing interests of other similarly situated 
asylum seekers permit the continued reliance on this legislative 
protection. 238 The problem is that there is no practical mechanism 
other than repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act, which would literally 
take an act of Congress, to properly address this problem. 239 Rather 
than take an opportunity to adjust the status of all Cuban refugees, the 
233. See Times Topics: Francois Duvalier, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.coml 
top/reference/timestopics/peopleldlfrancois _ duvalier/index.html (last visited May 16, 
2011). Francois Duvalier was "President for Life" in Haiti from 1957 until he died in 
1971. Id. His son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, ruled the country until 1986 when he was 
overthrown. Id. Both regimes were marked by corruption, brutality, and significant 
human rights abuses. See Larry Rohter, Mission to Haiti: The Thugs-Loose 
Cannons; Violence by Paramilitary Groups in Haiti Raises Pressure on u.s. to 
Disarm Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at 1, available at www.nytimes.coml 
1994/1 DID 1 Iworldlmission-haiti-thugs-Ioose-cannons-violence-paramilitary-groups-
haiti-raises.html?fta=y (noting that the United States was doing little to control the 
plain clothes paramilitary called attaches who kill at will). 
234. Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 907. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. Even worse, instead of creating an understandable immigration policy that 
addresses the needs of asylum seekers traveling here by sea, Congress and the 
Executive have created a game of "immigration roulette." Those seeking asylum by 
traveling to our shores, particularly Cubans, have a huge incentive in the form of 
parole status when they arrive. Id. However, the reality is that many lose their lives 
seeking the promise of easy entry once they stand ashore. See generally Nessel, supra 
note 7. 
237. See Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 911-14. 
238. Id. at 912-15. 
239. Id. at 917. 
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only shift in policy U.S. government has undertaken has resulted in 
yet another preferential subset of Cuban refugees. 240 
Instead of maintaining these problematic legislatively created 
presumptions for discrete groups at the expense of a broader class of 
potential refugees, a full application of the Refugee Act of 1980 
would be more practical. Legislative enhancements could still be 
used to support the Refugee Act, but every asylum applicant would 
have to satisfy the burden of demonstrating he or she is a refugee 
without the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of persecution. For 
example, those who suffer persecution as a result of a coercive 
population control may be deemed, via legislation or regulation, to 
have been persecuted on account of political opinion, but those 
designations should stop short of creating presumptive classes of 
refugees. Such an action could help other groups of potential asylees 
as well, including victims of domestic violence. In such a situation, 
an applicant for asylum would still have to demonstrate persecution, 
which lies at the heart of every asylum claim. 241 In the case of 
Chinese nationals, it would mean that both men and women would 
have to prove something beyond a forced abortion, such as actual 
resistance, but the policy would create a more equitable treatment of 
these claims. 242 
In the same way, the Cuban Adjustment Act could be repealed and 
Cuban "dry foot" refugees would be in no worse a position than their 
"wet foot" counterparts or other similarly situated asylum seekers. 243 
With fewer Cubans being granted automatic parole status, perhaps 
more equitable treatment of Haitian asylum claims could be achieved, 
even in conjunction with current interdiction policies. 244 
V. CONCLUSION 
While no system will be perfect, and our country's current system 
is far from perfect, we must continue to move forward in removing 
240. See id. at 915. 
241. See id. at 919. 
242. See supra notes 208-11 and 217 and accompanying text. 
243. This may be a good time to revisit our position on Cuba given the current economic 
reforms Cuba plans to implement. See Marc Lacey, Cuba Resets the Revolution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at WK.l, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2010/09119/ 
weekinreview/19Iacey.html. Cuba recently announced that it is implementing broad-
based economic changes including cutting 10% of the government work force and 
permitting much more extensive privatization. Id. 
244. The wisdom of our current interdiction policies, and their future, is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
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vestiges of discriminatory asylum preferences that originated in the 
1951 Refugee Convention and remain today. The application of 
nondiscriminatory asylum policies is an aspiration that is worth 
pursuing, and the removal of legislative preferences is the next step in 
that process. 
